I
n German public law, the principle of proportionality (Verhahnismafiiykeit) is designed to measure the legitimacy for all the state organs. It is the most significant, but 
ORIGIN
The origin of proportionality in German law can be traced back to the principle of necessity developed in the jurisprudence of Prussian administrative courts in the field of police law. After the Kreuzberg decision (14 June 1882, PrOVG 9, 353), the Prussian Supreme Administrative Court examined whether the measures adopted by the police went beyond what was considered necessary for attaining a relevant objective. Since
World War II, the principle of proportionality has been applied not only in the field of administrative law but in all areas of public law and as such has gained the constitutional character which guides the interpretation of all the lower laws. 
FIELD OF APPLICATION

LEGITIMACY
The legitimacy of proportionality is derived from the requirement to protect citizens' basic rights, one of the underlying constitutional values. The BVerfG has recognised proportionality as a constitutional principle on the basis of the principle of Rechtsstaat (rule of law or constitutional state) and the essence of the fundamental rights themselves. First, while requiring the legitimacy of all the state's actions to be compatible with the constitution, Rechtsstaat is designed to protect citizens' rights against interference by powerful state authorities. Secondly, the concept of human dignity enunciated in art. 
THREE COMPONENT ELEMENTS
Proportionality in German public law is an elusive concept, and its terminology in the case law has been the source of strong disagreement among legal writers. Nevertheless, the development of jurisprudence and academic theory has fleshed out a standardised scrutiny process consisting of three often overlapping, but theoretically distinct, elements or subprinciples.
Suitability
The first element is the requirement of suitability (Geeignetheit). It suggests that a public action be regarded at least as suitable for attaining its aim. The examination of this filtering element is limited only to the question whether the means chosen are considered as 'unsuitable for the purpose' or 'completely unsuitable' at the time of the legislation. A judicial decision with hindsight or even a false interpretation of the legislature does not automatically render a measure unsuitable and unconstitutional. Only a subsequent change in circumstances requires the legislature to repeal or amend the law, but this does not mean that the initial prognosis of the legislature was unsuitable. Very few means, whether laws or measures, have been held to be unsuitable (BVerfGE f7, 307, at 31ft (prohibition of an agency arranging car lifts); and f9, 330 at 338 (requirement of retailers to prove the expertise in the goods that they handled)).
Necessity
The second element is the requirement of necessity' (Erforderlichkeit). This means that the administrative authoritymust choose the least restrictive among equally effective means.
The degree of scrutiny depends on such factors as the nature of the rights to be protected and the serious effect of interference on individuals. The most stringent form of review is disclosed when either the legislature or administration is required to demonstrate the existence of the least harmful measure.
Nevertheless, this requirement is subject to an ex ante examination by the courts. Administrative agents are obliged to choose a measure considered as the least burdensome at the time of their decision. This means that if judges find a less injurious action with hindsight, this \vill not necessarily make the relevant authority's decision unlawful.
Proportionality stricto sensu
The third element is the idea of proportionality in the narrow sense. This demands a proper balance between the injury to an individual and the public interest in the course of an administrative measure. It prohibits those measures where the disadvantage to the individual outweighs the advantage to the public or the third person. The Basic Law is silent on how to balance and evaluate conflicting interests of different nature, but an examination of the case law identifies certain variables determining the standard of judicial control. These include the nature of the area concerned, the value of the purpose to be aimed at, the extent of the interference, as well as the nature of the constitutional rights affected.
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
The most significant aspect of the German theory of administrative discretion is that an agent is allowed discretion o only where this is expressly provided for in law. Exceptions to this requirement are allowed only in limited circumstances. The requirement of an express authorisation for administrative discretion means that the legislature must attempt to predict possible future developments in our society.
Another distinctive feature is that a sharp distinction is drawn between two stages of administrative actions: first, the interpretation of Tatbestand (constituent elements or definition of a provision) and, secondly, the determination of legal effects 
Strictness of review
In evaluating the level of scrutiny, particular attention must be paid to the questions whether and to what degree the judicial review involves any meaningful examination of facts and laws.
German judicial control goes beyond ascertaining whether or not a measure is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable in relation to the purpose pursued. A lax review should be disclosed unless the review focuses on the positive rather than negative proof of whether a specific action is actually necessary and proportionate (E Grabitz, 'Der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit in der Rechtsprechnung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts' (1973) 98 A6R 576).
Apart from the degree of interference the standard of scrutiny depends on the nature of rights concerned, varying from a highly strict examination of any infringement of civil and political rights to a relatively lax review as regards interference with fundamental rights of an economic nature (freedom to choose and exercise a profession and the right to own property). Such variations are based on an apparent, albeit not explicit, hierarchy of rights:
while administrative actions encroaching on civil and political rights imply an infringement of the democratic foundation of the constitution, economic rights need to be weighed against the requirements of the welfare state. On the one hand, interference with civil rights must be scrutinised more rigorously than the merely 'not-reasonable' test and accompanied by an extensive examination; on the other, judges tend to defer to the discretion of the legislature and administration in respect of the choice and form of necessary measures in the area of economic policy. The BVerfG has required that the 'objective effectiveness' of a less restrictive alternative be established 'unambiguously in every respect'. It may be argued that such a stringent requirement is no different from a burden of proof placed on individual applicants. However, the standard of control over economic rights depends on the combination of more complex factors. As regards the right to choose and exercise a profession under art. 12 GG, the BVerfG has established a three-tier control (Drei-Stufen-Theorie), applying different standards of review to each of the three aspects: exercise of profession, subjective and objective requirements for the choice of profession (BVerfGE 7, 377, at 399ff in particular, 401 9, 431, 432 and 442: pharmacy judgment).
legislature's task in this respect is even more complicated as the Basic Law is again silent on whether some constitutional rules override others. The drafter of the Basic Law has left only small clues, explicitly allowing certain basic rights to be regulated by legislation. Apart from such an express limitation, it is possible to consider that the constitution implicitly authorises the legislature to restrict even unreservedly guaranteed rights, but only in furtherance of other constitutional values (Grabitz, 576, 577) . Nevertheless, no infringement of the essential content of fundamental rights is allowed under art. 19(2)GG.
CONCLUSION
The application of the principle of proportionality has often been criticised for being so strict that it leaves little room for administrative discretion. Some also warn that a frequent and rigorous application of proportionality would lead to 'judicial legislation' in breach of the separation of powers, as judicial interpretation may override the scope of the rules intended by the legislature (Ress, 10). They argue that the power of balancing should be limited to cases where it is necessary to remedy unreasonable consequences that a literal application of laws may cause individuals (F Ossenbiihl, Der Grundsatz der Verhaltnismassigkeit des Grundrechtseingriffs' (1997) 12 Jura 610 21). In contrast, Maurer emphasises the historical significance attached to art. 19(4)GG, which is designed to protect individuals through the courts against encroachment by the state after the bitter experience under the Nazis. As he maintains, if this strict requirement no longer matches social needs, it is the task of the legislature to amend it, and the administrative authorities or judges are not allowed to make any restrained interpretation (Maurer, 143).
It is unlikely that the rigid features of proportionality' and administrative discretion will be changed in jurisprudence in the near future. Recent decisions have reaffirmed the BVerfG's consistent policy and dominant role in the protection of fundamental rights (Nolte, 208, 209; BVerfGE 83, 130; and 84, 59 ). Stringent judicial control over administrative discretion is embedded in Germany's special historical experience and buttressed by the post-war legal consciousness underpinning the requirements of Rechtsstaat, effective judicial remedy and due process (J Schwarze, European Administrative Law (1992) 272). At a time when the incorporation of proportionality is being hotly debated in England, it is of considerable importance to comparative lawyers to appreciate the particular historical consciousness underlying the German principle of proportionality'. ®
Limitations
The principle of proportionality is subject to limitations on its scope of application and effectiveness by virtue of certain constitutional mandates. Such limitation is justified on the ground of the separation of powers, and more precisely, judicial deference to the democratic legislator (N Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law (1996) 36 7). The Basic Law lacks any guideline on how to balance competing, but equally important, constitutional values and interests. The legislator is authorised to balance the relative values of conflicting private and communal interests in order to achieve a just result. The
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